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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
PIONEER VALLEY HOSPITAL, D.M. 
DICKSON, GEORGE D. VEASY, 
and DOES I through V, inclusive, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
RESPONDENT D.M. DICKSON'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989). 
The final order appealed from is comprised of the trial court's 
Jury Verdict Judgment dated May 11, 1989, entered in favor of. 
the defendants, and the trial court's order denying the 
Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial dated July 20, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are: 
1. Whether the trial court's Jury Instruction 
No. 16 was properly given to the jury in order to advance the 
jurors' understanding of the legal standards and burden of 
* 
* 
* 
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* 
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* 
* 
proof pertinent to the plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur and simple 
negligence causes of action. 
2. Whether the trial court's Jury Instruction 
No. 19 was properly given to the jury in order to advance the 
jurors' understanding of the burden of proof pertinent to 
the plaintiff's simple negligence cause of action. 
3. Whether the appellant failed to preserve her 
right to assign error to the trial court's Jury Instructions 
Nos. 16 and 19 because she did not properly object to those 
instructions pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
The above-captioned lawsuit is a medical malpractice 
action. The appellant alleges that the respondents negligently 
caused damage to her bridgework while she was undergoing 
(and/or recovering from) surgery on her left knee at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital. In prosecuting her actions at trial, the 
appellant relied upon both res ipsa loquitur and simple 
negligence theories of recovery. After listening to the 
evidence, and having been appropriately instructed regarding 
the legal standards and burden of proof pertinent to 
appellant's two theories of recovery, the jury concluded that 
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the respondents could not be held responsible for the damaged 
bridgework. 
Appellant now assigns prejudicial error to the trial 
court's reading of two standard jury instructions. As 
Respondent Dickson's brief demonstrates, no such error 
occurred, and even if it had, appellant's counsel did not 
properly object to the two instructions. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Pretrial Proceedings 
On October 9, 1986, appellant Lynn Nielson filed a 
complaint against Dr. D. M. Dickson, and other named 
defendants, alleging that her teeth and bridgework had been 
damaged due to the named defendants' negligence, before, during 
and/or after an operation on her left knee. (Trial 
Record—hereinafter "R."—2.) Appellant specifically alleged 
that her broken teeth and damaged bridgework were a direct and 
proximate result of Dr. Dickson's negligence in administering 
anesthesia to the appellant. (R. 2, paras. 13 & 34.) 
Appellant also alleged that Dr. Dickson, and the other named 
defendants, must be deemed presumptively negligent, under the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in their treatment of Lynn 
Nielsen. (R. 2, para. 28.) 
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During the proceedings below, counsel for appellant 
Lynn Nielsen elected not to name an anesthesiologist expert 
qualified to testify as to Dr. Dickson's alleged negligence in 
this case. Counsel for Dr. Dickson secured the expert opinion 
of Lawrence E. Reichmann, M.D., a board certified 
anesthesiologist, who is familiar with the facts surrounding 
the treatment received by Ms. Nielsen during and after her 
above-mentioned surgery. (R. 107.) Based upon his review of 
the medical records pertinent to the care of Ms. Nielsen on 
February 27, 1985, Dr. Reichmann concluded that "the care 
provided by D. M. Dickson, M.D., as an anesthesiologist, to the 
patient, Lynn Nielsen, did not fall below the standard of care 
required of anesthesiologists. The medical care he rendered is 
appropriate and met the standard of care required." (R. 108.) 
Based upon the above developments, respondents D. M. 
Dickson, M.D. and Pioneer Valley Hospital filed a joint motion 
for summary judgment on the grounds that the appellant was 
unable to meet her burden of establishing by competent medical 
expert testimony that the respondents had breached the duty of 
reasonable care they owed to the appellant. (R. 98 and 130.) 
This joint motion came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson on March 18, 1988. (R. 191.) On April 4, 
1988, Judge Wilkinson entered his Order and Summary Judgment 
granting the respondents' motions. (R. 200.) 
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The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment dismissal 
of her Complaint, and on September 16, 1988 her motion to 
the Utah Supreme Court for Summary Disposition was granted. 
(R. 211.) In granting the motion, the Utah Supreme Court 
indicated (1) that the trial court's summary judgment ruling 
was inappropriate because issues of material fact existed, and 
(2) that because Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) 
controlled the issue of res ipsa loquitur in the case, expert 
evidence would not be necessary to establish the applicable 
standard of care under the first prong of the three-part res 
ipsa loquitur test. (R. 211.) The Supreme Court remanded the 
case for trial, and this trial was conducted before a jury on 
April 17, 18 and 19, 1989. (R. 465, 466 and 467.) 
Trial 
The evidence elicited at trial revealed that on 
February 27, 1985, appellant Lynn Nielsen underwent surgery on 
her left knee while a patient at Pioneer Valley Hospital. 
(R. 465 at p. 90.) The surgery was performed by George D. 
Veasy, M.D. (R. 2, para. 10.) The anesthesia required for 
appellant's knee surgery was administered by respondent D. M. 
Dickson, M.D., a board certified anesthesiologist. (R. 2, 
para. 10.)(R.91-92.) 
Prior to the commencement of the knee operation, the 
appellant and Dr. Dickson talked at some length about the 
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appellant's bridgework and about the precautions that would 
need to be taken in order to protect that bridgework. (R. 
465-66 at pp. 92-93, 319, 321-330.) Subsequent to the 
appellant's intake interviews with Dr. Dickson and her other 
health care providers, the appellant was taken to surgery; upon 
emerging from surgery and regaining some level of consciousness 
in the recovery room, the appellant discovered that various of 
her bridgework teeth had been broken. (R.456 at pp. 95-96.) 
In her pretrial deposition testimony, the appellant 
(along with her husband, Mr. Elwood Nielsen) testified that Dr. 
Dickson told the appellant in the recovery room that he had no 
idea how the bridgework had been damaged. (R. 465 at pp. 
137-38). At trial, however, the plaintiff and her husband 
chose to testify that Dr. Dickson told them he had broken the 
dental work with a metal spatula (also known as a 
laryngoscope). (R. 465 at pp. 98-99, 126, 130-43.) This 
laryngoscope or "metal spatula" theory of simple negligence was 
expressly advanced against Dr. Dickson by appellant's counsel 
in his opening remarks to the jury. (R. 465 at p. 62.) 
Appellant's counsel attempted to further his client's 
simple negligence theory of recovery against Dr. Dickson by 
eliciting testimony from the Pioneer Valley Hospital nursing 
staff regarding what they saw with respect to Dr. Dickson's 
handling of the laryngoscope. (R. 466 at pp. 248, 289.) 
Appellant put on the opinion testimony of her dentist, Dr. Reed 
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Jorgensen, with regard to the causation of the bridgework 
damage and with regard to what the dentist believed would have 
been the best way to protect the teeth in question. Dr. 
Jorgensen concluded that the plastic airway inserted in the 
appellant7s mouth by Dr. Dickson was not the instrumentality 
that caused the damage to the appellant's bridgework. (R. 
465-66 at pp. 180-81, 208-11, and 222.) In indicating that the 
oral airway placed by Dr. Dickson could not have been the 
instrumentality that caused the damage to appellant's bridge-
work, Dr. Jorgensen even went so far as to indicate that the 
teeth may have been broken by use of the spatula or 
laryngoscope. (R. 466 at p. 222.) On cross-examination, Dr. 
Jorgensen did admit, however, that there was no evidence of any 
trauma, on the day following the surgery in question, to the 
plaintiff's mouth, lips, gums or tongue, and that it was 
possible for the damage to the front teeth of the bridgework to 
have occurred as the appellant was biting down on the oral 
airway. (R. 466 at pp. 227-28.) 
The nurse attending to Mrs. Nielsen as she was 
regaining consciousness in the recovery room was Pioneer Valley 
Hospital Nurse Joanne Henschke. (R. 4 66 at p. 258.) Nurse 
Henschke testified at trial that as the appellant was regaining 
consciousness, she was clamping down hard on the airway that 
had been inserted by Dr. Dickson. (R. 466 at p. 270.) 
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Respondent Dr. Dickson testified at trial that he had 
used an oral airway rather than an intubation technique in 
order to carefully protect the appellant's bridgework. (R. 466 
at p. 321.) Dr. Dickson indicated that he had had absolutely 
no difficulty in placing the oral airway. (R. 466 at p. 322.) 
Dr. Dickson stressed that at no time had he ever used a 
laryngoscope or metal spatula in any of his anesthetic 
treatment of the appellant. (R. 466 at pp. 322, 329-30, 364.) 
In fact, Dr. Dickson testified that he had carefully tilted the 
appellant's head during the initial administration of 
anesthetic, so as to prevent the appellant from swallowing her 
tongue, while he had an opportunity to administer further 
anesthetic with which to relax the appellant's jaw so that the 
oral airway could be inserted. (R. 466 at pp. 332, 384, and 
399.) 
Following the knee surgery, and as the appellant was 
being wheeled into the recovery room, Dr. Dickson examined the 
appellant's front teeth by pulling the airway back. He found 
the teeth to be in perfect condition. (R. at pp. 3 33, 
337-38.) Dr. Dickson testified that he did not know how the 
bridgework in question had been broken, but that he had told 
the appellant in the recovery room that the teeth may have been 
broken beause of the appellant's clamping down on the airway. 
(R. 466 at pp. 348.) Both Dr. Dickson and his medical expert 
witness, Dr. Lawrence Reichmann, testified that teeth can be 
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broken when a patient bites down on an oral airway, and that 
such damage can obviously occur without any negligence 
whatsoever on the part of the anesthesiologist. (R. 466 at pp. 
363, 377, 445-46, 449.) 
In his presentation of evidence and closing 
statements to the jury in this case, plaintiffs counsel 
stressed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover money 
damages under either a simple negligence theory of recovery or 
under a res ipsa loquitur theory of recovery. (R. 465-66 at 
pp. 98-99, 126, 130-143, 222.) Indeed, in his closing remarks 
to the jury, appellant's counsel stated: 
. . . I'd like to set forth once again the 
theories of law that my client is going 
under against these defendants. It's 
important because they are alittle bit 
separate. And if you agree with one 
theory, then some of the judge's 
instructions may not apply to the other 
theory. 
The first theory is the ordinary 
negligence theory against Dr. Dickson. 
Now, our other theory is the theory that 
the judge referred to as a res ipsa 
loquitur theory. This is against Pioneer 
Valley Hospital and Dr. Dickson. 
So the judge read you some jury 
Instructions in which he stated that you 
are not permitted to use your own standard 
and your own experience with physicians in 
determining negligence. That is true for 
the common, for the ordinary negligence 
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theory that we are going under, that the 
doctor was just ordinarily negligent as a 
doctor. [Emphasis added.] 
(R. 467 at pp. 477-78, 480.) 
Dr. Dickson's counsel proffered Jury Instruction 
No. 19 because the plaintiff expressly and unequivocally relied 
upon a simple negligence theory of recovery (i.e., the "metal 
spatula" theory) in advancing her case at trial. (R. 319.) 
Appellant's counsel never objected in open court to 
Jury Instructions No. 16 and No. 19. In fact, Mrs. Nielsen's 
counsel never brought to the Court's attention any objection he 
had to Jury Instructions No. 16 and No. 19. After the Court 
had sent the jury out to deliberate and the judge had retired 
to his chambers, plaintiff's counsel took the court reporter 
aside and made a record, outside of the court's hearing, of his 
objections to Instructions No. 16 and No. 19. (R. 4 67 at pp. 
541-42.) 
The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action on 
April 19, 1989. (R. 467 at pp. 543-44.) The jury verdict 
order was entered by the trial court on May 11, 1989, (R. 376) 
and the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied on July 
20, 1989 (R. 461.) The plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal in 
the case on June 9, 1989, and subsequently filed her Docketing 
Statement on June 29, 1989. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lynn Nielsen's appeal is based on the assertion that 
the trial court erred when it read to the jury Instruction 
No. 16 pertaining to impermissible presumptions in a medical 
malpractice case and Instruction No. 19 pertaining to the 
determination of the relevant standard of care in simple 
negligence cases. Appellant's assignment of error fails to 
provide a basis for a successful appeal for three reasons. 
Jury Instruction No. 16 was perfectly consistent with 
both the res ipsa loquitur and the simple negligence theories 
advanced by the plaintiff at trial. Instruction No. 16 is no 
more than a standard cautionary instruction given in all 
medical malpractice cases regardless of whether the plaintiff 
proceeds against a defendant physician on a theory of res ipsa 
loquitur or on a theory of simple negligence. The cautionary 
instruction merely informs the jury that a physician can never 
be deemed to be a guarantor of successful results, and that 
when adverse results from a physician's course of treatment do 
arise, those results in and of themselves do not allow the 
jury to presume that the defendant physician was negligent. 
The case law pertaining to Jury Instruction No. 16 makes it 
quite clear that the instruction can and should be given in 
both simple negligence and res ipsa loquitur medical 
malpractice actions. The cautionary instruction, designed to 
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bring home to jurors that physicians are no more than human 
practitioners of the medical art, is perfectly consistent with 
the standard res ipsa loquitur instruction (which was given in 
the present case). Together, Instruction No. 16 and the 
standard res ipsa loquitur instruction informed the jury that a 
three-part test must be met before an inference of negligence 
arises. The caution contained in Instruction No. 16, which 
mandates that no inference of negligence may arise from the 
occurrence of a bad result alonef is perfectly consistent 
with the requirement that the jury find (1) the bad result was 
of a kind which in the ordinary course of events would not have 
happened had the defendant physician used due care, (2) the 
instrumentality or thing causing the injury was at the time of 
the accident under the management and control of the defendant 
physician, and (3) the accident happened irrespective of any 
participation at the time by the plaintiff. Clearly, Jury 
Instruction No. 16 given in the present case is fully 
compatible with, and in fact reinforces, the standard res ipsa 
loquitur instruction that sets forth the three-part finding 
which is a threshold to the inference of negligence. 
Similarly, Jury Instruction No. 19 was perfectly 
consistent with, and was necessitated by, appellant's simple 
negligence theory of recovery presented at trial. In 
plaintiff's counsel's presentation of evidence at trial and 
closing statements to the jury, counsel indicated that the 
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plaintiff should recover money damages based upon either a 
simple negligence theory or upon a res ipsa loquitur theory. 
Once the plaintiff's counsel advanced a simple negligence 
theory at trial, the defendants had no choice but to request 
that the trial court give the jury Instruction No. 19 so that 
the jury would fully understand the plaintiff's burden of proof 
on that theory. 
Even if the trial court did error in reading the jury 
Instructions No. 16 and/or No. 19, the appellant's requested 
relief must be denied because appellant's counsel failed to 
bring to the trial court's attention any objection he had to 
those instructions as is required by Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff's counsel gave the Court no 
opportunity to assess any possibility of error and take proper 
corrective measures while the jury was still seated. By 
failing to raise an adequate objection to the instructions, 
plaintiff's counsel failed to preserve any assignment of error 
pertaining to those instructions. 
A R G U M E N T 
THREE PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
Before reviewing the case law pertinent to the 
propriety of Jury Instructions No. 16 and No. 19, it is 
important to bear in mind three preliminary observations. 
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1. 
First, there is absolutely no dispute in the record 
on appeal that the plaintiff proceeded at trial with the 
presentation of evidence and with argumentation that advanced 
both a simple negligence and a res ipsa loquitur theory of 
recovery. Appellant's counsel did an admirable job at trial in 
walking the fine line of presenting just enough negligence 
evidence so as not to ruin his client's res ipsa loquitur 
case. See Roylance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1987); 
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1984) (a plaintiff may proceed on both res ipsa loquitur and 
ordinary negligence theories, and have the jury instructed on 
each theory, so long as the plaintiff's evidence of negligence 
doesn't "fully explain the cause of the injury by positive 
evidence revealing all of the facts and circumstances"). As 
the Statement of Facts outlined above indicates, Lynn Nielsen's 
counsel attempted to prove his client's simple negligence 
theory of recovery when he presented evidence through his 
client (R. 465 at pp. 98-99, 126, 130-143) and through 
Mr. Elwood Nelson (R. 465 at pp. 152-53), indicating that 
Dr. Dickson had negligently caused the appellant's bridgework 
damage with a metal spatula. Appellant's counsel attempted to 
further this "metal spatula" simple negligence theory of 
recovery by presenting the testimony of dentist Reed Jorgensen, 
who stated that the damage to the appellant's bridgework was 
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caused by an instrumentality other than the airway inserted 
in the appellant's mouth by Dr. Dickson. (R. 465-66 at pp. 
180, 208-211, 222.) Finally, appellant's counsel unequivocally 
admitted that he was advancing both a res ipsa loquitur and 
simple negligence theory of recovery at trial when, in closing 
argument, he stated to the jury: 
. . .I'd like to set forth once again the 
theories of law that my client is going 
under against these defendants. It's 
important because they are a little bit 
separate. And if you agree with one 
theory, then some of the judge's 
instructions may not apply to the other 
theory. 
The first theory is the ordinary 
negligence theory against Dr. Dickson. 
. . . 
Now, our other theory is the theory that 
the judge referred to as the res ipsa 
loquitur theory. This is against Pioneer 
Valley Hospital and Dr. Dickson. 
(R. 467 at pp. 477-78.) There can be no question that the 
appellant proceeded with her case below based upon the two 
theories of recovery referred to in her counsel's closing 
remarks. The Court's Jury Instructions No. 16 and No. 19 were 
entirely appropriate and consistent with these two theories of 
recovery. 
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2. 
Second, the question is raised on page 11 of the 
Appellant's Brief as to precisely what it was the Utah Supreme 
Court remanded to the trial court by virtue of the Supreme 
Court's September 16, 1988 reversal of Judge Wilkinson's 
summary judgment ruling. (See the Utah Supreme Court 
reversal Order attached as Addendum "A".) The appellant 
maintains that this Court's Order and remand applied only to 
her res ipsa loquitur theory of recovery. On its face, 
however, the Supreme Court's Order of reversal states that "The 
trial court was manifestly in error in granting summary 
judgment since material facts are in dispute." In referring to 
the trial court's summary judgment order, the Utah Supreme 
Court presumably referred to the entire summary judgment 
order. Indeed, the Supreme Court's reversal and remand appears-
to have been based on two independent findings: first, that 
the trial court's ruling was made in the presence of disputed 
issues of fact, and second, that the ruling as it pertained to 
res ipsa loquitur was incorrect because the Supreme Court's 
review of the case revealed no need for expert testimony 
relative to that theory. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's 
reversal of Judge Wilkinson's summary judgment ruling can 
clearly be construed as a reversal of the entire summary 
judgment order and remand of all of the plaintiff's original 
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causes of action "for further proceedings.11 Whether all of 
the appellant's original causes of action contained in her 
initial Complaint were remanded for trial or not, however, this 
Court must not lose sight of the fact that appellant's counsel 
expressly chose to advance both a theory of simple negligence 
recovery and a theory of res ipsa loguitur recovery while 
presenting evidence and making closing remarks at the trial 
below. Appellant has had her day in court with an opportunity 
to recover on two different theories. A jury has spoken and 
the verdict should be upheld. Two bites at the apple is enough. 
3. 
Finally, in reviewing the propriety of Instructions 
No. 16 and No. 19, this Court should be cognizant of the 
well-established principle that jury instructions given at 
trial must be read as a whole when any particular instruction, 
or any part of a particular instruction, is being reviewed for 
error. Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638 (Utah 
1987); Bigler v. Mapleton Irr. Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1983); Ewel & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 493 P.2d 
1238 (Utah 1972) (the fact that a plausible argument as to 
error could be made by singling out certain portions of 
instructions did not justify upsetting a verdict and judgment 
where the instructions considered together gave the jury a fair 
understanding of the issues of fact to be determined and the 
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law applicable thereto); Taylor v. Johnson, 414 P.2d 575 
(Utah 1966). In her brief, appellant is particularly fond of 
picking out the first sentence from the trial court's Jury 
Instruction No. 16, and parading that sentence as evidence of 
error, without fairly reading the first sentence of the 
instruction within the context of the rest of the language 
contained in the instruction and within the context of the 
trial court's jury instructions as a whole. When this Court 
reads Instructions No. 16 and No. 19 within the context of the 
entire set of trial instructions, and particularly within the 
context of the plaintiff's evidence and argument at trial, the 
Court will have no difficulty upholding the propriety of the 
instructions. 
The jury instructions of particular importance in 
this appeal read as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
A physician is not a guarantor of 
successful results, and therefore, no 
presumption of negligence arises from the 
fact of an adverse event occurring during a 
defendant's treatment. The measure of duty 
owed by the defendant physician to the 
patient is that degree of care, skill and 
diligence ordinarily possessed and 
exercised, under similar circumstances, by 
other physicians in the same practice and 
profession. The physician must use 
ordinary and reasonable care and diligence 
in providing medical care to the patient. 
If you find from the evidence in this case 
that the doctor provided care in compliance 
with the standard as defined in these 
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instructions then you must find for the 
defendant physician. 
If complications or adverse results occur 
in connection with a doctor's treatment of 
a patient, such facts, in and of 
themselves, do not prove that the doctor 
was negligent. [Emphasis added.] 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
In determining whether the physician 
properly fulfilled his duty imposed upon 
him as a physician, in his treatment and 
care of plaintiff, you are not permitted to 
use a standard derived from your own 
experience with physicians, nor any other 
standard of your own. 
The standard of professional care by which 
the physician is to be judged by you is 
that degree of learning, care and skill 
ordinarily possessed and used by other 
physicians undertaking the care of a 
patient under similar circumstances in the 
same field of practice at the time such 
treatment and care was rendered. 
The only way you may properly learn such 
standard and thus determine whether or not 
the physician in this case conformed to 
it, is through evidence presented during 
this trial by physicians in the same field 
of practice testifying as expert witnesses 
who knew of that standard as it existed at 
that time. [Emphasis added.] 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
The Court instructs you that in certain 
situations it is not necessary for the 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action 
to present evidence of the defendants' 
negligence by expert testimony. 
Specifically, where the propriety of the 
treatment received is within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman, 
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expert testimony is unnecessary to 
establish the standard of care owed to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff must, however, 
establish by the evidence that: 
1. The accident was of a kind which, in 
the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had the defendant(s) used due 
care; 
2. The instrument or thing causing the 
injury was at the time of the accident 
under the management and control of the 
defendant(s); and 
3. The accident happened irrespective of 
any participation at the time by the 
plaintiff. 
If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that all three of the above 
criteria have been met, then you may find 
an inference of negligence from those 
circumstances. This does not mean that 
negligence is necessarily established, it 
merely creates an inference which may be 
rebutted by the defendant or defendants. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
If in these instructions any rule, 
direction or idea has been stated in 
varying ways, no emphasis thereon is 
intended, and none must be inferred by 
you. For that reason, you are not to 
single out any certain sentence, or any 
individual point or instruction, and ignore 
the othersf but you are to consider all 
the instructions as a whole, and to regard 
each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are 
given has no significance as to their 
relative importance. [Emphasis added.] 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY REGARDING THE LEGAL STANDARDS AND BURDEN 
OF PROOF APPLICABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Jury Instruction No. 16 was Perfectly Consistent with 
Both the Res Ipsa Loquitur and Simple Negligence 
Theories of Recovery Advanced by the Plaintiff at Trial. 
The appellant's contention in her brief with regard 
to Jury Instruction No. 16 is that the cautionary 
instruction is somehow inconsistent with the evidence presented 
and argument made by appellant's counsel during trial. It is 
too well-settled, however, to be disputed that a cautionary 
instruction like Jury Instruction No. 16 can and should be 
given in all medical malpractice cases regardless of whether 
the theory advanced by the plaintiff is res ipsa loquitur or 
simple negligence or both. 
In Miller v. Kennedy, 588 P.2d 734 (Wash. 1978), 
the Washington Supreme Court dealt with the precise issue at 
hand and concluded that in the context of a res ipsa loquitur 
case, a cautionary instruction like Jury Instruction No. 16 can 
and should be given when requested by defense counsel. In so 
holding, the court reasoned that: 
The [cautionary instruction] states that a 
bad result of treatment in itself is not 
evidence of negligence. Appellant contends 
this is erroneous and conflicts with the 
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doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as 
accurately set forth in another 
instruction. Res ipsa loquitur is a 
doctrine allowing a trier of fact to draw 
an inference the defendant was negligent 
when certain circumstances are present. 
Where the agency or instrumentality causing 
the injury was in control of the defendant, 
and the injury is of a type which would not 
ordinarily result if the defendant were not 
negligent, a jury may infer from the fact 
of the injury that the defendant was 
negligent. This relieves the plaintiff of 
the necessity of proving the defendant's 
actual negligent act. The doctrine does 
not allow the jury to infer a defendant was 
negligent from the facts of the injury 
alone, however. The plaintiff must show 
the other elements were present — that is, 
the control by the defendant over the 
instrumentality, and the nature of the 
injury as ordinarily resulting only from 
negligence. The instruction challenged 
here accurately states that a bad result or 
injury in itself is not evidence of 
negligence. . . . Instruction No. 5 fthe 
cautionary instruction] is neither 
erroneous nor misleading, and the court did 
not err in giving the instruction to the 
jury. [Emphasis added.] 
588 P.2d at 737. 
Similarly, in Voss v. Bridwell, 364 P.2d 955 (Kan. 
1961), the Kansas Supreme Court endorsed the giving of a 
cautionary instruction, like Instruction No. 16 in the present 
case, where a plaintiff advances both res ipsa loquitur and 
simple negligence theories in a medical malpractice action 
against a physician. In such a case, the Court ruled, it is a 
"basic principle" that " a physician is not a guarantor of good 
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results, and civil liability does not arise merely from bad 
results." Id. at 963, 970. 
Jury Instruction No. 16 given in the present case, 
particularly as as this instruction is summed up in its last 
sentence, is clearly endorsed by cases like Miller and 
Voss. The instruction is also implicitly endorsed by the 
Utah Supreme Court's long line of cases requiring that the 
standard three-part test be met before a jury may infer 
negligence in a res ipsa loquitur case. See e.g.F Dalley 
v. Utah Valley Regional Med. Ctr.. 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990) 
(the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires plaintiff to 
establish an evidentiary foundation which includes the 
following: the accident was of a kind which in the ordinary 
course of events, would not have happened had the defendant 
used due care; the instrument or thing causing the injury was 
at the time of the accident under the management and control of 
the defendant; and the accident happened irrespective of any 
participation at the time by the plaintiff); Kusy v. K-Mart 
Apparel Fashion Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984); Anderton v. 
Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980); Moore v. James, 5 Utah 
2d 91, 297 P.2d 221 (Utah 1956). 
Instruction No. 16 simply stands for the well settled 
principle that, whether a doctor is sued on a theory of simple 
negligence or res ipsa loquitur, adverse results occurring in 
connection with the doctor's treatment can never in and of 
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themselves prove that a doctor was negligent or give rise to a 
presumption of such negligence. The instruction read in its 
entirety fully comports with and explicates a standard caution 
that should and must be given to jurors in medical malpractice 
cases to ensure that those jurors realistically view physicians 
as human practitioners of a medical art who cannot guarantee 
against the occurrence of all potential mishaps that may crop 
up during the course of any given treatment. 
It is important to observe that the trial court in 
the present case provided the jury with Instruction No. 27 
indicating that the jury had a duty to read all of the Court's 
instructions as a whole. (R. 357.) When the task of reading 
the trial court's jury instructions as a whole is performed, 
there is no question that Jury Instruction No. 16 is not only 
completely compatible with the Court's res ipsa loquitur 
instruction (Instruction No. 22), but it is also clear that 
Instruction No. 16 reinforces the principle set forth in the , 
res ipsa loquitur instruction. Instruction No. 16 stands for 
the simple proposition that a presumption of negligence in a 
medical malpractice case cannot arise from the occurrence of an 
adverse result alone. This proposition is picked up by, and 
elucidated in, Instruction No. 22 which indicates that the jury 
must find that a three-part test has been met before an 
inference of negligence can arise. Instruction No. 16 and 
Instruction No. 22 work together to precisely define the 
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circumstances that must exist before an inference of negligence 
can arise in a medical malpractice case. Because Jury 
Instruction No. 16 is completely compatible with, and in fact 
reinforces, Jury Instruction No. 22 requested by the appellant, 
the appellant has no basis for assigning any error to the 
giving of Instruction No. 16. 
B. Jury Instruction No. 19 was Properly Given in Light 
of the Simple Negligence Theory Advanced by the 
Plaintiff at Trial. 
a. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts above, and on 
pages 14-17 of this brief, appellant's counsel attempted to 
persuade the jury during the presentation of evidence and in 
closing statements that the plaintiff should recover money 
damages if the plaintiff was able to prove either (a) her 
simple negligence case, or (b) her res ipsa loquitur case. 
Since the plaintiff chose to advance these dual theories of 
recovery at trial, defense counsel had no choice but to insure 
that the jury was properly instructed on all elements of the 
plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to each theory. 
Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638 (Utah 1987); 
Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987). 
Dr. Dickson's counsel had an obligation to ensure 
that the jury was read Instruction No. 19 because of the 
well-settled principle in this jurisdiction that a plaintiff 
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cannot prove an ordinary negligence claim of medical 
malpractice unless a plaintiff has expert testimony with which 
he or she can establish "(1) the requisite standard of care, 
Marsh v. Pemberton. 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, 1110 
(1959); (2) defendants failure to comply with that standard, 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980); and (3) 
that defendant caused plaintiff7s injuries, Huqcrins v. 
Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957)-" Hoopiiaina 
v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987). 
While this Court's remand order dated September 16, 1988, may 
have eliminated the need for expert evidence with regard to the 
standard of care applicable to appellant's claim against Dr. 
Dickson, the remand order is completely silent with regard to 
whether expert testimony is necessary to prove the breach and 
causation elements of the simple negligence theory advanced by 
the appellant at trial. 
Because the appellant chose to put on evidence 
indicating that Dr. Dickson had negligently caused appellant's 
bridgework damage by mishandling a metal spatula used to insert 
the airway in Mrs. Nielsen's mouth, the appellant had the 
express obligation to put on the testimony of anesthesiologists 
familiar with the handling of such metal spatulas in order to 
show how Dr. Dickson had inappropriately used the spatula so as 
to have breached the relevant standard of care. Roylance v. 
Rowe, 737 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1987). The appropriate (and 
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inappropriate) handling of the metal spatula, which 
anesthesiologists are trained to use in a particular manner 
under particular circumstances, is a technical aspect of an 
anesthesiologist's treatment of a patient. Whether a given 
anesthesiologist makes proper or improper use of a metal 
spatula in inserting an airway, particularly in light of the 
fact that different patients react to various anesthetics in 
different ways, is a technical medical question beyond the ken 
of lay jurors. The trial court appropriately drew this 
conclusion, and properly read the Jury Instruction No. 19 so 
that the jurors would understand the nature of the evidence 
they could appropriately consider when deliberating upon the 
issue of whether Dr. Dickson breached the duty he owed to the 
appellant. 
Additionally, because respondent Dickson had come 
forward with the expert testimony of Dr. Lawrence E. Reichmann, 
indicating that Dr. Dickson had fully complied with the 
standard of care required of anesthesiologists, the trial court 
was persuaded that the appellant had an obligation to come 
forward with similar expert testimony on the highly technical 
question of whether Dr. Dickson had somehow breached the 
pertinent standard of care and whether that breach had caused 
the appellant's damages. 
Not only did Dr. Reichmann's testimony make it clear 
to the trial court that a technical medical question arose when 
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the appellant chose to advance her "metal spatula" theory of 
ordinary negligence, but the trial court was also concerned 
that the plaintiffs witness, Dentist Reed Jorgensen, would be 
regarded by the jury as an expert on the technical question of 
whether Dr. Dickson made appropriate use of the metal 
spatula. When Dr. Jorgensen testified that he did not believe 
the airway inserted in the appellant's mouth by Dr. Dickson 
could have caused the bridgework damage in question, his 
testimony was clearly being used by the appellant to advance 
the "metal spatula" theory of ordinary negligence. In reading 
the Jury Instruction No. 19, the trial court not only set forth 
the appropriate legal standard applicable to the breach of due 
care issue, but the court also ensured that the jury would not 
extend Dr. Jorgensen's opinion regarding causation into the 
realm of the jurors' deliberation upon the breach of due care 
issue. 
The conclusion that must be drawn with regard to Jury 
Instruction No. 19 is that the appellant herself brought the 
instruction into play when she chose to specifically allege 
that Dr. Dickson had caused the bridgework damage in question 
by mishandling his metal spatula. By making this specific 
allegation of ordinary negligence, and by advancing this theory 
in tandem with her res ipsa loquitur theory, the appellant 
imposed upon her own case the significant burden of coming 
forward with expert anesthesiologist testimony in order to 
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demonstrate the way in which Dr. Dickson mishandled the metal 
spatula so as to have breached the pertinent standard of care. 
By altering her pretrial deposition testimony (where the 
appellant and her husband indicated that Dr. Dickson had told 
the appellant he did not know how the bridgework had been 
broken) to allege for the first time at trial that Dr. Dickson 
had admitted to breaking the bridgework with his metal spatula, 
the appellant ran the grave risk of being totally impeached on 
the witness stand. More importantly, however, in altering her 
testimony, the appellant also effectively asked that 
Instruction No. 19 be read to the jurors so they would 
understand that the manner in which Dr. Dickson used his metal 
spatula must be assessed by his medical peers in order for a 
fact finder to determine whether any duty owed to the appellant 
by Dr. Dickson had been breached. Jury Instruction No. 19 was 
entirely appropriate in light of the appellant's tactical 
decision to go forward with a simple negligence theory of 
recovery. 
b. 
Jury Instruction No. 19, just like Jury Instruction 
No. 16, can be read as entirely consistent with the trial 
court's Jury Instruction No. 22 (the res ipsa instruction) when 
all of the court's instructions are read as a whole. 
Instruction No. 22, by its own terms, is simply a court 
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approved exception to Instruction No. 19 with regard to the 
establishment of a standard of care in the case. 
Appellant's counsel fully explained to the jury, in 
both his opening and closing remarks, precisely how the three 
part res ipsa loquitur test operated both generally and within 
the confines of the evidence elicited in the present case. (R. 
465 and 467 at pp. 56-59, 480.) With the jury's attention 
keenly focused upon the res ipsa loquitur requirements as being 
the appellant's primary theory of recovery at trial, the jury 
well understood that the appellant did not need to come forward 
with expert evidence in order to prove the standard of care 
applicable to her case. (R. 465 and 467 at pp. 57-58, 480.) 
The jury had no rational alternative, therefore, but to 
relegate Instruction No. 19 to the negligence cause of action 
which appellant's counsel referred to as a second and 
completely separate theory of recovery relied upon by the 
appellant. (R. Id.) Indeed, in his closing remarks to the 
jury, appellant's counsel expressly stated: 
So the judge read you some jury 
Instructions in which he stated that you 
are not permitted to use your own standard 
and your own experience with physicians in 
determining negligence. That is true for 
the common, for the ordinary negligence 
theory that we are going under, that the 
doctor was just ordinarily negligent as a 
doctor. [Emphasis added.](R. 467 at p. 
480.) 
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Even though appellant's counsel failed to tell the jury in his 
closing remarks that Jury Instruction No. 19 should only be 
considered within the confines of the appellant's simple 
negligence cause of action, in light of the plain language on 
the face of Instructions Nos. 19 and 22, and in light of the 
appellant's repeated statements to the jury that expert 
evidence was not required in appellant's res ipsa loquitur 
case, it is difficult to see how the jury could possibly been 
confused by the two instructions. 
POINT II 
LYNN NIELSEN'S RELIEF REQUESTED ON APPEAL MUST BE 
DENIED BECAUSE HER COUNSEL FAILED TO PROPERLY 
OBJECT TO INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND NO. 19 AT TRIAL. 
A review of the record on appeal reveals that at no 
time during the trial in the above-captioned case did 
appellant's counsel draw the Court's attention to any 
objection he had to Jury Instructions Nos. 16 and 19. The only 
time plaintiff's counsel took exception to these instructions, 
was when he took the court's reporter aside, after the jury had 
retired to deliberate, and made the record attached hereto as 
Addendum "B". (R. 467 at pp. 54-42.) The judge was not 
present when this record was made. (R. 467 at p. 540.) Such 
an objection constitutes no objection at all and fails to 
provide any basis whatsoever for an Appeal. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(attached as Addendum "C") mandates that: 
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No party may assign as error the giving or 
failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving 
of an instruction, a party must state 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds for his objection. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently had occasion to articulate the 
purpose of Rule 51 and to identify the parameters of a proper 
objection made under the Rule. In Beehive Medical 
Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983), 
the Court stated that: 
This court has interpreted the foregoing Rule 
to require that an objection lodged to an 
instruction be specific enough to give the 
trial court notice of the very error in the 
instruction which is complained of.... 
[T]he purpose of the Rule ... is to put 
the trial court on notice of error in the 
instructions and thereby afford the court an 
opportunity to correct the error before the 
case is presented to the jury. 
Id. at 860-61. 
This Court's opinion in Beehive Medical clearly 
establishes that one of the prerequisites to an adequate 
Rule 51 objection is direct notice to the trial court that 
error is being ascribed to a given instruction before the 
jury retires to deliberate. In the present case, appellant's 
counsel's essentially silent objection, voiced only to the 
court reporter, in no way served to comply with the 
requirements set forth in Beehive Medical. If the appellant 
-32-
had wanted to preserve the improper jury instruction issue for 
the purpose of an appeal, an appropriate objection would have 
to have been voiced directly to the trial judge before the 
case was given to the jury to decide. Id; Gill v. Timm, 
720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986) ("The court must be afforded a timely 
opportunity to correct its error, or the objecting party will 
have waived its right to argue the objection on appeal.") It 
is incumbent upon trial counsel, for the purpose of preserving 
appellate issues, to timely object to perceived trial court 
error in a manner that provides the court actual notice of 
the basis for the objection. Id. It has never been the 
responsibility of trial judges to ensure that trial counsel 
follow the procedures necessary to preserve issues for appeal. 
In addition to being untimely, the phrasing of 
appellant's late objection indicated no more than a generalized 
opinion that Instructions No. 16 and No. 19 are "improper 
statement[s] of the law on the case of res ipsa loquitur." (R. 
467 at p. 542.) This is the same generalized language that the 
court in Beehive Medical denounced as failing to serve the 
purpose of Rule 51. Id. at 861. See alsoy Morgan v. 
Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 1985) 
("Our rules of civil procedure requires that to preserve an 
objection for appeal, a party must object with specificity at 
trial.) Accordingly, just as in the Beehive Medical case, 
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the plaintiff in the present case cannot assign any error to 
the giving of Instructions No. 16 and No. 19. 
Under the standards set forth in Rule 51 and the case 
law cited above, Lynn Nielsen's counsel wholly failed to 
apprise the trial court of his objections to Instructions No. 
16 and No. 19. Appellant afforded the trial court no 
opportunity to correct any potential jury instruction error and 
cannot, therefore, now attempt to assign error to the giving of 
Instructions No. 16 and No. 19 in order to trump up a basis for 
an appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's relief requested on appeal must be 
denied because: (1) the jury instructions allegedly causing 
prejudicial error were perfectly consistent with the simple 
negligence and res ipsa loquitur theories of recovery advanced 
by the plaintiff at trial; and (2) the appeal is based upon the 
giving of jury instructions which appellant's counsel failed to 
adequately object to at trial. 
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A D D E N D U M A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOOO 
Regular May Term, 1988 September 16, 1988 
Lynn Nielsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
REMITTITUR 
No. 880170 
District No, C86-7731 
v. 
Pioneer Valley Hospital, 
D.M. Dickson, George D. Veasy 
and Does I Through V, inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellant's motion for summary disposition of this 
matter is hereby granted. The trial court was manifestly in error in 
granting summary judgment since material facts are in dispute. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) is 
controlling on the issue of res ipsa loquitur. Expert evidence is not 
necessary to establish the applicable standard of care in this case, 
as it appears no medical technicalities are involved. 
The Summary judgment is reversed and this case is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
Issued: September 26, 1988 
Record: None
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1 to give requested -- the following requested jury 
2 instructions: Failure to give requested Jury 
3 Instruction No, 12, as 12 is an appropriate and correct 
4 I statement of the law, 
5 Failure to give requested Instruction No. 13 
6 for the reason that it's an appropriate statement of the 
7 law. Exception to the Court's failure to give all of 
8 Instruction No. 15 as it also represents an appropriate 
9 statement of the law. 
10 Exception is taken to the Court's failure to 
11 give requested Instruction No. 17. 17 is an accurate 
12 statement of the law as it pertains to the question of 
13 professional services and medical negligence. 
14 And failure to give requested Instruction 
15 No. 18 for it, too, is an appropriate statement with 
16 regard to what the law is concerning the question of 
17 professional services and medical negligence. 
18 One last exception is failure to give 
19 requested Instruction No. 19 because it is also 
20 supported by the law and is an appropriate statement and 
21 is important to this case with regard to the claims that 
22 were made by the plaintiff as to res ipsa. 
23 No other exceptions. 
24 MR. DARGER: All right. Plaintiff Lynn 
25 Nielsen takes exception to Instruction 16 given by the 
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1 Court because it indicates that there should be no 
2 1 presumption of negligence arising from adverse events 
3 occurring during the defendants1 treatment. And this i 
4 an improper instruction in a res ipsa loquitur case. 
5 And plaintiff also takes exception to 
6 Instruction No. 19 where it indicates that the jury is 
7 not permitted to use a standard derived from their own 
8 experience with physicians, nor any of their own 
9 standards. Because again this is an improper stat. ent 
10 of the law on the case of res ipsa loquitur, 
11 particularly the common knowledge exception applicable 
12 | to that rule and applicable in this case. 
13 Those are all of the exceptions I have. 
14 (Off the record.) 
15 
16 
17 V E R D I C T 
18 (Reached at 12:00 noon, but court assembled at 
19 12:30 p.m. after all had arrived.) 
20 THE COURT: The record may show that all 
21 members of the jury are present. 
22 Members of the jury, have you met and 
23 selected one of your group as foreperson? 
24 JUROR 2: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: And Dr. Bevan, are you the forema 
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ADDENDUM C 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 51 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments 
§§ 106 to 151, 75 Am Jur 2d Trial § 463 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 49 C J S Judgments §§ 59 to 61, 
88 C.J S Trial §§ 249 to 265. 
A.L.R. — Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or 
direction of verdict on opening statement of 
counsel in civil action, 5 A L R 3d 1405 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-
fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A L R 3d 
1330. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A L R 3d 1113 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 199; Trial «=» 
167 to 181. 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this 
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object-
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the fore-
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity 
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of 
the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, 
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that 
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during 
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence, 
made a minor punctuation change in the sec-
ond sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-to-
last sentence, and substituted "jurors" for 
"jury" in the second sentence in the second 
paragraph 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule varies sub-
stantially from Rule 51, F R C P , after which 
it is patterned 
Cross-References. — Exceptions unneces-
sary, Rule 46. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Comments on evidence. 
—Allowed and disallowed 
—Proper 
Accurate statement of facts. 
Copy of instructions. 
—Delay. 
Meaning. 
—Entire context 
Necessity of objections 
—Failure to object 
Appellate review 
Burden of overcoming 
Court's failure to instruct 
Waiver 
—Opportunity to object. 
Effect of denial 
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